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Abstract 
 
 
Most states in the United States guarantee all citizens the right to an adequate education. 
Missouri passed SB 287 in 2004 with this exact purpose in mind. The bill was designed 
to ensure that students in high-poverty districts receive a greater share of funds from the 
state to offset shortfalls in local revenue. The new funding formula has certainly created 
great disparity in the amounts of state funds various districts receive. In addition, the 
formula recognizes the financial need of districts that have a high percentage of students 
living in poverty. Despite this recognition, adequacy has not been achieved for Missouri’s 
impoverished schools. Using school districts in St. Louis County as a case study, it is 
clear that outcomes in high-poverty districts are not adequate. Wealthy districts continue 
to outspend poorer districts per pupil. Poorer districts continue to have unacceptably low 
outcomes.  This disparity is exaggerated by a foundation formula that is not fully funded, 
pulling an irresponsible amount of resources away from Missouri’s impoverished 
schools.  A new funding formula is not needed; however, small and reasonable changes 
must be made to the current one.  First, the weighting for students on free-and-reduced 
lunch must be doubled.  Second, Missouri should use the current assessed valuation of all 
districts in the state when calculating local effort, rather than the frozen 2004 levels.  
Third, Prop C funds should not count as local effort for Missouri’s impoverished school 
districts.  And fourth, wealthy districts should lose their hold-harmless designation until 
the Missouri General Assembly fully funds the educational formula.  These small and 
important changes are needed to remedy the paradox of Missouri’s impoverished schools: 
the students that need the most, too often get the least. 
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Section One: Introduction 
 At the time of its creation, the United States was the most liberal democracy in the 
world.  The true revolution of American independence was not in the breaking of 
political ties from Britain, but rather the rejection of central authority and executive 
power.  If local control over a weak government was to succeed, the Founders believed a 
spirit of republicanism was necessary among the American people.  This republican 
spirit, which Gordon Wood calls the true essence and radicalism of the American 
Revolution, placed high expectations on citizens (Wood, 1993).  Independent citizens, 
who put the public good before their private interest, were needed to preserve a republic.  
This required, among many things, republican citizens to be literate and educated.  It is 
no wonder, therefore, that the Revolutionary generation desired a strong system of public 
education in the United States (Wood, 1993; Wood, 2002). 
 As the Founders envisioned and hoped, public education has expanded throughout 
American history.  In doing so, it has remained a largely local matter under local control.  
Public schools are controlled by elected school boards and state departments of 
education.  And they are overwhelmingly financed by property taxes, supplemented by 
state aid.  Decentralized control and decision-making has created concerns about equality 
of education for all students.  The greatest concern, due to local financing of schools, is 
that students in poorer communities receive an education that is not equal to those in 
wealthier communities.  There is a fear that local financing fails to fulfill state 
constitutional requirements of providing each citizen with an adequate education.  If the 
Founders were correct, the failure to adequately educate all citizens will have an adverse 
effect on our republic. 
  1 
The History of Education Finance Reform 
The struggle for equality in American education began over a century ago.  While 
the most notable case in school equality, Brown v. Board of Education, dealt specifically 
with racial segregation, equality of financing for disadvantaged students has been far 
more difficult to solve.  (It should be noted, of course, that race and socioeconomic status 
has not yet been fully separated in the United States.)  Beginning with the Progressive 
Movement at the turn of the twentieth century, reformers have criticized an over-reliance 
on local property taxes to fund public schools.  They claim that school quality has long 
been too connected to the level of wealth in a district (Odden, 2014; Guthrie et al., 2007).  
Wealthy districts are able to have above-average spending while having below-average 
tax rates.  For poorer districts the opposite is true (Odden, 2014).  This leaves children in 
poorer districts with fewer educational resources; they likely need more. 
 Remedies for this inequality began to appear in the 1920s.  States implemented 
“minimum foundation” programs to create a minimum level of support that was not 
reliant on local funds.  As decades passed, these foundation programs became 
increasingly inadequate to meet student needs.  Wealthier districts increased local 
support, mostly from property taxes; poorer districts were unable to easily do so (Card, 
2002).  Lawsuits began to challenge the rising inequality during the 1960s.  At first, these 
lawsuits challenged the system of financing public schools under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and similar equal 
protection clauses in the various state constitutions.  In 1989, litigation began to 
challenge public school financing for not providing adequate education to all students. 
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 Most state foundation formulas attempt to determine a level of per-pupil spending 
that is adequate to meet the constitutional requirements of an effective and efficient 
education.  Once that level is determined, the state generally provides all funds that 
cannot be provided by local taxes.  State funds are allocated at much higher levels to 
poorer districts.   
Adequacy in Missouri 
In 2006, Missouri joined the many states that implemented new foundation 
formulas in response to legal challenges based on adequacy clauses in state constitutions.  
In fact, Missouri changed its system of financing public education without a specific 
court order to do so.  The new formula, created by Senate Bill 287 in 2005, was designed 
to ensure that all students in Missouri public schools receive an adequate education.  As 
occurred in most states, the new funding formula in Missouri resulted in a higher 
percentage of state aid going to poorer districts. 
 Missouri’s funding formula is designed to ensure that every student in the state 
receives funds that are adequate for an appropriate education.  In order to do this, the 
formula first calculates the level of per-pupil spending that is needed for an adequate 
education.  The formula then provides additional funding for schools that have a 
relatively high number of students who fit specific high-need categories.  There are the 
three of these categories.  The first is free-or-reduced lunch price (FRL), a measure of 
student poverty.  The second is Individualized Education Plans (IEPs), a measure of 
students qualifying for special education services.  The final category is Limited English 
Proficiency, which measures students who are not native speakers of English.  If a school 
district has a higher-than-average number of students in any of these categories, their 
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adequacy level for per-pupil spending is weighted and raised.  Finally, districts with a 
relatively high cost of living are assumed to need a higher level of adequacy spending.  
After determining this adequacy level, the state subtracts the funds that are raised locally 
within the school district, received mostly from property taxes.  The Missouri foundation 
formula then gives each school district the funds required to cover the difference.  (Shuls, 
2012; MSBA, 2014)  The process of funding Missouri public schools will be explored in 
greater depth in Section Three. 
Adequacy in St. Louis County 
Missouri’s funding formula has similar features of most of the states in the United 
States (Shuls, 2012).  The state has fulfilled its requirements under the education 
adequacy clause in the state constitution.  But this is not enough.  Large disparities 
continue to exist in the educational outcomes among districts in Missouri.  This paper 
will focus specifically on school districts in St. Louis County and make state-wide 
recommendations based on that discussion. 
As in Missouri, there is a wide gap in St. Louis County between the highest and 
lowest performing school district.  The best measure of performance is the Annual 
Performance Report (APR) score from the Missouri School Improvement Plan (MSIP5).  
This score measures a district’s performance on the indicators of academic achievement, 
achievement by racial subgroup, college and career readiness, attendance, and graduation 
rate.  There are a total of 140 possible points; a district’s APR is the percentage of those 
total possible points they receive. 
The top-performing school district in St. Louis County, Lindbergh, earned a score 
of 99.3 percent on their APR in 2015.  The lowest-performing school district, Normandy, 
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earned an APR of 30.4.  Other indicators of student performance yield similar disparities.  
Clayton earned the highest average ACT score in 2015 with 25.6.  Normandy scored 
lowest in this category as well, with an average ACT score of 14.0, which means that the 
average Normandy student is not qualified to gain admission to most state universities.  
Clayton had a graduation rate of 100 percent in 2015.  The graduation rate of Normandy 
was 55.9.   
To be fair, the Normandy School Collaborative has had great struggles and is 
particularly low in St. Louis County.  Normandy on the low end and Clayton at the 
opposite, however, are not just isolated outliers.  Twelve out of the 22 districts in St. 
Louis County (Special School District was not included in any data or trends discussed in 
this paper) have a graduation rate above 95 percent, while six districts had a rate below 
80 percent.  Thirteen districts in St. Louis County have an APR that is above 96 percent, 
while five have an APR below 80.  And seven districts have an average ACT score that is 
above 22, while seven have an average score that is below 18.  These data will be 
discussed further in Section Four. 
 These gaps in performance are not necessarily indicative of a funding formula that 
is unconstitutional.  Funding based on adequacy, rather than equity, can certainly create 
disparate results in per student funding.  Of course spending is not perfectly correlated 
with a school district’s performance, which will be discussed further in Section Two.  
However, it is clear that the lowest-performing districts in St. Louis County are not 
providing an adequate education for their students.  School districts with high 
concentrations of impoverished or minority students are far behind other districts in APR 
scores, ACT averages, and graduation rates. 
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 Trends can be seen in the data from St. Louis County.  First, the top-performing 
school districts spend only slightly more per pupil than the lowest performing districts, as 
seen in Graph 1.  Lindbergh for example, the district with the highest APR in St. Louis 
County, spends less per pupil than almost every other district in the county. 
Graph 1: Annual Performance Report by Per-Pupil Spending, 2015 
 
(Discussion of all data is based on trends; no statistical significance tests were 
performed.) 
Missouri’s funding formula, specifically the weights for high-need students, 
however, assumes that schools should spend more if they have a relatively large number 
of these students.  This does not always happen in St. Louis County.  A clear second 
trend is that districts with large numbers of high-need students do not get more money 
per pupil than those with low numbers of these students.  This is especially true for the 
indicator of poverty, as seen in Graph 2. 
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Graph 2: Spending Per-Pupil by Free-and-Reduced-Lunch Students, 2015 
 
 
A final trend is that those districts with the highest number of Black students tend 
to be some of the lowest performing districts.  Research (Baker and Green, 2009) has 
shown that there is “strong, consistent evidence across settings that black student 
concentration is associated with higher-predicted costs of achieving constant outcomes, 
and that those cost differences are quite large for majority black school districts.”  (289)  
This is likely the result of concentrated poverty.  Despite poverty being weighted in the 
Missouri funding formula, this need is not met in St. Louis County, as districts with a 
high percentage of Black students both perform lower and spend less on average than 
other districts.  And despite the fact that low-income school districts receive more funds 
from the state of Missouri; the high levels of local effort continue to mean higher per-
pupil spending in wealthy districts.  The chart below highlights six districts in Missouri 
that demonstrate school funding and outcome inequities based on race. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of St. Louis Area School Districts, 2015 
District % of Black Students Spending per Pupil APR Score 
Clayton 17.7 $17,869.77 98.6 
Kirkwood 14.5 $12,420.98 98.9 
Ladue 17.1 $12,879.05 99.3 
Ferguson-
Florissant 80.7 $11,146.29 69.6 
Jennings 98.5 $10,325.07 81.1 
Riverview Gardens 98.1 $10,712.66 79.3 
Source: Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, FY2015 
 
 The funding formula for the state of Missouri is inadequate at closing the 
spending gap between affluent and high-poverty school districts. If we hope to address 
the systemic issues faced by these high need districts, this must change.  Change, 
however, will not come easy.  It is unlikely that Missouri will adopt an entirely new 
funding formula.  According to the Missouri Supreme Court, the current funding formula 
is constitutional.  It also falls in line with how many other states fund public education.  
One major problem is that the Missouri foundation formula is underfunded.  The General 
Assembly of Missouri would need to increase funding by $556 million in 2015 to make 
up the current shortfall (MSBA, 2015).  The shortfall is prorated among all of the districts 
in the state.  This proration means that the districts which are supposed to receive the 
most state funds, those that are poorer with more high-need students, also lose the most 
from Missouri’s lack of funds.  This underfunding is irresponsible and must be addressed.  
While this shortfall is not the primary purpose of this policy paper, it will be addressed 
further in Section Four.   
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Stakeholders 
 A large number of stakeholders have an interest in the allocation of state 
educational resources.  Families with school-age children care deeply about where state 
education dollars go.  Any changes in funding that would be seen as a redistribution of 
their contributions to students in other districts would meet resistance.  Most individual 
households and businesses would resist increases in taxes unless they were convinced of 
the direct benefit those increases would have on local schools.  As discussed in Section 
Two, those benefits can be questionable.  Local school boards, administrators, teachers, 
and families would resist any decreases in state aid to their districts.  State politicians and 
the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) officials 
would also have a high interest in any changes that would occur to the funding formula. 
 Nearly every citizen and public official in the state of Missouri is a stakeholder in 
education finance.  Any changes that occur will increase the benefits to some while 
decreasing the benefits for others.  Even if changes would positively affect the entire state 
in the long-run, there would be winners and losers initially.  Just because change would 
be difficult politically, however, does not mean that change should not be attempted.  
This policy paper will outline several large and small changes that should be made to 
Missouri’s current funding formula.  Many of these changes call for the redistribution of 
current funds.  Others call for an overall increase in funds. 
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Recommendations 
Increase weights for free-and-reduced lunch students 
The first change that must occur to Missouri’s funding formula is the weights that 
are given to high-need students.  Missouri weights the daily attendance of school districts 
for high-need students that cost more to educate (Shuls, 2012).  These weights artificially 
increase the average daily attendance, increasing the revenue that a district receives from 
the state.  Data suggest that there is a strong correlation between the percentage of 
students in a district that receive free and reduced lunch prices (FRL) and the district’s 
APR scores, as seen in Graph 3.  Similar trends can be seen for graduation rates and ACT 
scores.  The current weight for these students is too low. 
Graph 3: Annual Performance Report by Free-and-Reduced Lunch, 2015 
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Recalculate assessed valuation for all districts 
DESE calculates local funds using the assessed valuation of a district at the end of 
2004 and assumes a property tax levy of $3.43 per $100 of assessed valuation.  
Anchoring a district’s valuation to 2004 must be changed.  It is important to note that if a 
district’s assessed valuation decreases from its 2004 levels, it is recalculated.  This is 
appropriate and is a benefit to districts which are losing wealth.  Districts that have an 
increasing assessed valuation, however, are not recalculated.  This means school districts 
that experience increasing wealth will receive more state funding than they would if the 
assessed valuation were updated (Shuls, 2012).  In an underfunded foundation formula, 
this money should go to poorer districts, instead of the poorer districts losing more 
because of the system of prorating the shortfall. 
Change Prop C funds for high-FRL districts 
Funds from Proposition C, a 1% statewide sales tax for education implemented in 
1982, must also be addressed.  The state currently distributes these funds based on a 
district’s Weighted Average Daily Attendance (WADA) and counts fifty percent of the 
funds as local funds (Shuls, 2012).  The distribution of these funds is appropriate, but the 
portion counted as local effort should drop to 0% for districts with at least 41% of its 
students, the state average, on the free or reduced lunch program. 
Drop hold-harmless distinction for wealthy districts until education is fully funded 
When the state implemented the new funding formula in 2005 it included a “hold-
harmless” provision.  Among other guarantees, this provision ensures that districts with 
greater than 350 students will not receive less state funding per-WADA than they did 
during the 2005-2006 school year.  This means that larger districts with increasing local 
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support will receive more state money than they otherwise would under the new funding 
formula (Shuls, 2012).  This single part of the “hold-harmless” provision should be 
removed.  But it should only be removed for districts that have more than 350 students 
and have less than 41 percent of its students using the FRL program.  This 
recommendation could be removed once the foundation formula is fully funded.  This 
would reduce the burden on an underfunded foundation formula and ensure that poorer 
districts receive an amount closer to their fair share.  Because of the system of prorating 
the shortfall, poorer districts receive even less of their fair share than wealthier districts. 
The above changes, discussed in greater detail in Section Five, will provide 
greater funds to poorer districts that generally perform low on APR, graduation rates, and 
average ACT scores.  Some of these changes will rebalance the current foundation 
formula, thereby decreasing state aid to wealthier districts in St. Louis County and 
throughout the state.  Other changes call for an increase in the total amount of state aid, 
which would require the state to increase funding for public education, not only to cover 
the current shortfall, but to provide the necessary money for these increases as well. 
 States have been consistently increasing money to public education over the past 
several decades.  Beginning in the early 1990s, these funding increases have been a result 
of adequacy lawsuits or the threat of such lawsuits.  A tremendous amount of research 
has been conducted on the effects of the new funding formulas on student outcomes. 
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Section Two: Literature Review 
A wealth of research has examined the effectiveness of adequacy-based school 
finance reform.  Using one to two decades worth of data, researchers have asked two 
broad questions.  Did adequacy-based school finance reform create greater financial 
equity among school districts within a state?  Further, did this financial reform increase 
student performance, particularly in high-poverty districts?  This research has largely 
focused on states that have shifted significant responsibility for school finance away from 
local sources and toward state general funds, which is similar to the reform that began in 
Missouri in 2005.  Findings were mixed, but much research has shown that adequacy-
based school finance reform had small to moderate effects on equity and student 
performance. 
Equity of Education Resources – National Studies 
 The three waves of school finance litigation are not as disconnected as they may 
seem.  The first two waves focused on equity, first national equity from the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the second on state-based equity.  The final wave has emphasized 
adequacy, arguing that adequacy is essentially a product of vertical equity.  Vertical 
equity is the principle by which schools are not funded based on perfect dollar-per-
student equality (horizontal equity), but rather at a level that equally addresses their 
students’ needs.  In other words, vertical equity implies that school districts with hard to 
serve students would get more funding than schools with easier populations.  This was 
Missouri’s goal with the passage of SB 287 in 2005.  States like Missouri that focused on 
creating vertical equity among districts should have seen horizontal equity affected as 
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well.  Much of the research over the third wave of education finance reform has sought to 
discover both of these effects. 
 Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998) conducted one of the first large-scale studies 
to determine the effects of adequacy litigation.  Using expenditure data from 1972 to 
1992, they reviewed 16,000 school districts to determine if court-mandated reform 
reduced within-state inequality.  They found that this reform movement did in fact reduce 
inequality by a measure of 19 to 34 percent.  The gains in equity were obtained by 
increasing spending in the poorest districts rather than decreasing spending in the 
wealthiest districts, a process known as leveling-up.  Therefore, the reform movement not 
only decreased inequity, but increased the aggregate level of primary and secondary 
education spending in the United States.  Recommendations made in this paper call for 
both leveling-up and redistribution through reducing state aid to wealthier districts. 
 Reformers have expressed concern that increasing state aid might simply be offset 
with an exaggerated drop in local taxes.  In 2002, Card and Payne conducted a macro-
level study to determine the aggregate financial equity effects of the adequacy reform 
movement.  Their final working sample took data from every state except Alaska, 
Hawaii, and Washington D.C. between 1977 and 1992.  Excluding only districts that did 
not exist at the beginning or end of their sampling years, they collected data from 13,036 
districts.  They found that a one dollar increase in state aid increased district educational 
spending by 50 to 65 cents.  In addition, they attempted to discover the effects on equity.  
They found that in states where the foundation formula was ruled unconstitutional, 
changes were made that redistributed aid to lower-income districts.  The gap in state aid 
between poor districts and wealthy districts widened by about $300 in real terms per-
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pupil during this time period.  Like Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998), Card and Payne 
found that this redistribution was a result of leveling up rather than leveling down.  In 
studying broader economic data, however, Card and Payne found that much of the state 
funding redistribution was offset by widening inequality in local revenues between richer 
and poorer districts.  This would be a concern in St. Louis County as well.  Many of the 
poorer districts are in areas of the county that are struggling economically. 
 Figlio, Husted, and Kenny (2004) also performed a national-level study, focusing 
on the political environment in states that attempted adequacy-based financial reform.  
The authors found that education spending reflected the legal and political situation 
within a state and that court rulings have not been the sole determinant of education 
finance reform.  Interestingly, they found that strong adequacy language in education 
clauses in the state constitution greatly affected the strength of reform.  States that had a 
more heterogeneous population had greater spending inequality.  States that were 
controlled by the Democratic Party had less spending inequality.  Missouri currently has 
a Democratic Governor, but the state legislature, the General Assembly, is strongly 
controlled by the Republican Party.  Gerrymandering has made Republican control of the 
General Assembly a near certainty for many years to come. 
Equity of Education Resources – State Studies 
 In March 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a ruling in the 
landmark case of San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.  The Court determined that 
education is not a fundamental right under the United States Constitution, nor are those 
with low amounts of wealth a suspect class that need protection under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (West and Peterson, 2007).  This ended 
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the first wave of education finance litigation, which used the US Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause, just two years after the Serrano decision.  Litigation at the national 
level will not work to fix inequity in education finance.  Congress cannot easily address 
the issue either, as Arocho (2014) calls for in his study of continued inequity in 
educational opportunity based on the wealth of a zip code.  Despite the calls by some 
researchers (Gillespie, 2010), the Rodriguez decision meant that equity and adequacy 
disputes would have to be fought on a state-by-state basis (Odden, 2014; Baker and 
Green, 2014).  Much of the research concerning the equity effects of adequacy litigation, 
therefore, has focused on individual states and provides the most useful information for 
making recommendations for education finance reform in Missouri. 
 The Lake View School District of Colorado filed a lawsuit in August of 1992 
claiming that the use of property taxes as the primary means of funding public schools 
was not permitted under the Colorado constitution.  They argued that such a system was 
fundamentally unfair to both students and taxpayers.  Before the case was decided, 
Colorado passed Act 917 in 1995, which required state equalization funds to be 
distributed to districts based on assessed property value and average daily attendance 
(ADA) of students.  The case expanded to include both equity and adequacy claims; in 
2000, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled the state’s education finance system 
unconstitutional, finding an inherent disparity between wealthy and poor districts.  This 
decision pushed Colorado to reform their foundation formula in 2002 and begin 
subsidizing to reach adequacy levels.  State categorical funding increased 761.4 percent 
(Jordan, Chapman, and Wrobel, 2014).  Jordan, Chapman, and Wrobel (2014) have 
shown that the tax burden on low-income districts was reduced after the 2002 reforms, 
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but as of 2008, low-income districts continued to have a greater tax burden than wealthy 
districts.  Disadvantaged districts were significantly better off after the reforms, which 
had no effect on property value.  Earlier research by Ramirez and Siegrist (2011) 
continued to find that districts with substantial numbers of students enrolled in English 
Language Learner (ELL) programs were funded differently than districts without such 
students.  This research confirmed continued inequity in Colorado public schools. 
 Missouri was a relative late-comer to adequacy-based reform; most states 
increased state funding to pursue redistribution of educational resources by the year 2000 
(Glenn, 2009).  Results have been mixed.  Reforms in Kansas were effective in at least 
increasing the aggregate level of educational expenses in the state.  Neymotin (2010) 
found that when adjusted for inflation, school revenue per student went from $7,500 in 
1997 to $9,400 in 2006.  Equity measures have not shown significant change in Kansas.  
Driscoll and Salmon (2008) found that when Virginia increased state funding for public 
schools by $755 million from 2003 to 2005, “equity actually declined, [continuing] a 
highly disparate system of public education that has been growing worse.”  (244)  The 
increased inequality of $300 per student was a result of poorer districts lowering their 
local tax contributions as state aid increased, which wealthier districts chose not to do.  In 
Massachusetts, Verstegen (2007) found that educational funding was still 35 percent 
below levels that were needed for adequacy. 
 Maryland’s Bridge to Excellence in Public Schools Act was phased in between 
2004 and 2008.  It increased state aid to all public schools by $1.3 billion, expanding aid 
to districts for special education, students at risk, and students with low English 
proficiency levels.  The money went disproportionately to districts with high numbers of 
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minority students or students that came from families living below the poverty line.  
Chung (2015) states that the reforms were not statistically significant in changing school 
spending for all districts, but did raise the spending levels for the schools in the bottom 
40 percent.  He believes that the reforms have weakened the relationship between local 
wealth and local spending, reducing the gap between the highest and lowest spending 
districts. 
 Michigan’s Proposal A was passed by voters in 1994 and shifted a major portion 
of school funding away from local sources and to the state.  Izraeli and Murphy (2007) 
found that Proposal A increased state aid to school districts from $2.63 billion in 1994 to 
$7.74 billion in 1995, the first year of the reform.  State aid shifted from 28 percent of an 
average district’s budget to 75 percent.  In addition, aggregate school spending increased 
nearly 9 percent during the first year of reform implementation.  Despite these massive 
shifts, Izraeli and Murphy found it difficult to confirm that equity measures changed 
significantly.  In fact, they found that teacher salaries rose below the rate of inflation, 
which was not true prior to the reform.  A separate measure of potential equity, student-
teacher ratio did improve throughout the state, disproportionately helping disadvantaged 
districts.  The authors concluded that while the reform made Michigan’s system of school 
finance more wealth neutral, it did not achieve its goals. 
 Podgursky, Smith, and Springer (2008) studied the effects of education finance 
reform in Missouri.  While indicating that vertical equity absolutely improved in the 
state, the researchers indicate that determining adequacy levels for the various districts 
and students in the state would be a “hopeless endeavor.” 
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Foundation Formula Modifications 
 While states made significant changes to their foundation formulas following the 
third wave of adequacy litigation, inequities have continued.  Many of these inequities 
are the result of modifications that have been allowed to the foundation formulas 
designed to protect districts from losing significant amounts of revenue (Toutkoushian 
and Michael, 2007).  Known as “overlay provisions,” these modifications include 
economies-of-scale adjustments, floor and ceiling limits, and alternatives allowed to the 
foundation grant (Toutkoushian and Michael, 2008).  Missouri’s foundation formula has 
several overlay provisions, as discussed in Section Three.  Toutkoushian and Michael 
(2008) state that “overlay provisions can be expected to introduce inequities into 
foundation aid programs because of how they redistribute revenues and can affect other 
goals in ways that may not be anticipated by policymakers.”  Their research in Indiana 
indicated that overlay provisions disproportionately benefited communities with higher 
wealth per pupil.  In Massachusetts, Fahy (2011) also found that overlay provisions 
benefited wealthier communities, but districts with high proportions of low-income 
students as well. 
Property Wealth and School Quality 
 The preceding research clearly indicates that neither horizontal nor vertical equity 
have not been achieved as a result of the final wave of adequacy-based education finance 
reforms in the late-twentieth century.  School districts continue to rely on local property 
taxes and wealthier districts continue to spend more per-pupil on average.  It is 
interesting to review the literature on the effect that quality schools have on property 
value.  Research (Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger, 2011; Machin, 2011; Brunner, Murdoch, & 
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Thayer, 2002; Dhar and Ross, 2012) clearly indicates that as school quality improves, the 
improvement is capitalized into higher property values.  Local tax increases for school 
budgets have been consistently approved by voters (Silverman, 2011) as well.  Increasing 
property values and increasing willingness to approve higher property tax rates likely 
means that inequity based on district wealth will continue into the future. 
Student Achievement – National Studies 
 There are several classic studies of adequacy reform and educational outcomes.  
Nearly all of them found weak or nonexistent connections between increased spending 
and higher student achievement.  One of the seminal researchers is Eric Hanushek, who is 
cited by nearly every article in this literature review.  Hanushek (1996) found that there 
was little evidence between an increase in money for schools and student performance 
outcomes.  Nearly a decade later, John Yinger (2004) found that there was only partial 
evidence that a boost in state aid, which presumably raises the overall level of education 
expenditures, can boost student performance.  As a result of the inability to hold other 
factors constant, he believes it is very difficult to prove either way.  Downs and Figlio 
(1999) did find a small positive relationship between school-finance litigation and student 
outcomes.  Not all research has been so pessimistic. 
 In 2008, William Glenn found a positive relationship between adequacy litigation 
and scores on the NAEP exam for Black students.  In 2009, Glenn concluded a 
longitudinal analysis of the relationship between adequacy litigation and student 
achievement using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten 
Cohort.  His analysis revealed that adequacy litigation had a positive relationship with 
achievement test scores of students from very low socioeconomic backgrounds, though 
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the effect was small.  Interestingly, Glenn’s analysis found that these positive gains were 
only on an interstate basis, despite school finance reform affecting only a single state at a 
time.  He argued that adequacy litigation can be an effective piece of comprehensive 
school reform, but is not sufficient alone. 
 As discussed previously, the macro study of 16,000 school districts by Murray, 
Evans, and Schwab (1998) found court-mandated reform reduced intrastate spending 
inequality.  In addition, they found that raising school expenditures overall improves 
labor-market outcomes for students, including future earnings and high school graduation 
rates.  Card and Payne (2002) used SAT scores to measure the effects of school finance 
reform.  While they admit the precariousness of using SAT data, they did find evidence 
that spending equalization efforts had closed the SAT-performance gap between students 
from disadvantaged family backgrounds and those of moderate or wealthy means by 5 
percent.  There are a wide range of average ACT scores among districts in St. Louis 
County. 
 One interesting study (Baicker and Gordon, 2006) directly challenged the 
traditional notion that more money has not been found to improve student performance.  
Baicker and Gordon analyzed the school spending patterns in states that were ordered to 
alter their foundation formula by the court system.  They found that those states often 
offset increases in education funding with marginal declines in spending on health and 
hospitals, highways, and public welfare.  They argue that while a child’s educational 
environment may have improved, noticeable gains were possibly offset by decreases in 
other necessary services.  This is a powerful argument for the importance of collective 
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impact.  While not the focus of this paper, it is hoped that the recommendations made 
here would be coupled with an increased emphasis on social services as well. 
Student Achievement – State Studies 
 As discussed, education finance reform is essentially a state issue.  Much of the 
research on the effects of adequacy-based education finance reform has been done on the 
state level.  In 2003, Deke found that a 20 percent rise in annual per-pupil expenditures in 
Kansas increased the probability of students entering post-secondary education by 5 
percent.  Epple and Ferreyra (2007) found that Michigan reforms beginning in 1994 
generally improved school quality and student performance in the Detroit metropolitan 
area.  Moreover, Sherlock (2011) found that Vermont’s major legislative education 
finance reform act, known as Act 60, may have had a positive impact on fourth grade 
pass rates in math, although it did not significantly affect student scores in reading or 
writing.  She found that these effects were seen in low-spending schools, not low-
achieving schools.  In Kansas, Neymotin (2010) found that changes from the previous 
decade in per-pupil revenues caused changes in measures of student achievement.  And in 
Maryland, Chung (2015) found little evidence that increases in spending decreased the 
dropout rate, but did find evidence that the socioeconomic gap in student performance 
was narrowed. 
 The decision by Kentucky’s Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better 
Education (1989) began the third wave of school finance litigation, focusing on 
adequacy.  Burbridge (2008) studied the results of such litigation for Kentucky itself.  
Her study collected data on math achievement from the fourth and eighth grade NAEP 
exams not only from Kentucky, but from other states that could be used for interstate 
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comparison as well.  After analysis, she found small gains for Kentucky.  When 
comparing Kentucky with “sister states” such as Mississippi, West Virginia, and 
Arkansas, Burbridge found that the states each made similar gains from education finance 
reforms that began during the 1990s.  She found that Kentucky lagged behind other 
leading reform states, using Texas and North Carolina specifically. 
 A great deal of research has been conducted regarding the effects of Michigan’s 
Proposal A.  This referendum dramatically shifted public funding and school funding in 
the state of Michigan.  As discussed earlier, state responsibility for school district budgets 
was significantly increased, from 28 percent to 75 percent.  It is interesting to note that 
Proposal A sought to increase equity by leveling up, as wealthier districts’ budgets were 
left largely untouched through “hold harmless” provisions. 
Leslie Papke (2005 and 2008) conducted several rounds of research to assess the 
effects of Proposal A on student performance in Michigan.  She examined data on test 
scores, per-student spending, school enrollment, average teacher salaries, and student-to-
teacher ratios for the state.  She used student eligibility for Michigan’s school lunch 
program as a proxy measure for the economic well-being of the district.  In a 2005 study, 
she found that the lowest-spending 10 percent of school districts also had the lowest 10 
percent of pass rates.  She found that this percentile saw the greatest increase in pass 
rates, jumping 15.7 percent in the first year of reform.  It is important to note that all 
percentiles increased in pass rates; the pass rates of the highest-spending percentile 
increased 11.47 percent.  This could indicate a change in the test itself.  In examining 
fourth grade math scores on the state-wide standardized test, she found that a 10 percent 
increase in average spending increased the pass rate by .66 to 6.80 percent, depending on 
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which variable was controlled (Papke 2005).  In her first round of research (2005), Papke 
declared that a rough rule-of-thumb would be that a 10 percent real spending increase 
would increase pass rates by 1 to 2 percent.  Upon revisiting the research in 2008, she 
largely affirmed her earlier findings.  Low-spending districts saw substantial increases in 
their per-student funding.  She recalculated her estimate as a 10 percent increase in real 
spending to create an increase in student performance by 2.5 percent. 
In 2009, Chaudhary released major research on Michigan’s Proposal A.  The 
purpose of the study was to measure the causal effects of increased inputs on fourth and 
seventh grade math scores.  Data were collected from 1991 to 2000.  Following Proposal 
A, Chaudhary calculated that the average real increase in school operating expenditures 
across the state of Michigan was 5.8 percent.  This was largely used to increase teacher 
salaries and decrease class sizes, two factors that research has indicated should improve 
student performance.  Chaudhary found positive effects on fourth grade math scores, but 
no statistically significant effects on seventh grade math scores.  She is unsure if schools 
intentionally targeted spending toward lower grades or whether spending is more 
effective at increasing outcomes at lower grades.  Instructional expenditures in schools 
across Michigan were increased by a real average of 8.3 percent.  Class size decreased by 
4.6 percent and teacher salaries increased by 6.6 percent.  Overall, Chaudhary made 
several conclusions.  Data suggest that a 10 percent increase in spending would increase 
fourth grade “scaled” math scores by 1.2 points, which is one-tenth of a standard 
deviation.  This is a small effect, as spending would have to be increased by 100 percent 
to improve fourth grade “scaled” math scores by a single standard deviation.  
“Satisfactory” math scores would only require a 60 percent increase in spending to 
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increase a single standard deviation.  There was no effect of increased expenditures on 
seventh grade math scores and it could not be determined if class size affects math scores.  
Increased teacher salaries, however, did appear to positively impact test performance. 
A final study on Missouri (Podgursky, Smith, and Springer, 2008) made an 
interesting observation on student achievement and equity/adequacy based reform.  The 
authors found that the vast majority of student achievement inequality was within a 
district and therefore was not affected by changing foundation formulas regarding state 
aid.  The study recommended that adequacy-based reform be attached to students rather 
than schools or districts.  The socioeconomic segregation and patchwork of school 
districts in St. Louis County likely mean that there is less concern about this 
recommendation than in the rest of the state.  However, this would be an interesting 
subject for future research and policy recommendation. 
Student Achievement and Race 
 The main focus of this literature review was on research pertaining to adequacy-
based education finance reform and socioeconomic equity.  In the United States, race 
continues to be a factor related to wealth and location.  Chart 5 shows the percentage of 
Black students in each district in St. Louis County.  Graph 3 shows the correlation 
between that percentage and APR scores.  There is a great deal of research on education-
finance equity, race, and student achievement.  A few studies, focusing on financial 
equity, are presented here. 
 In the discussion of adequacy and state-constitutional requirements of an effective 
education, several studies note that the costs of an adequate education are higher in 
majority-Black schools.  Baker and Green (2009) found “strong, consistent evidence 
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across settings that black student concentration is associated with higher-predicted costs 
of achieving constant outcomes, and that those cost differences are quite large for 
majority black school districts.”  They also found that Black-white achievement gaps far 
outweigh disparities along other racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic divisions.  Their study 
of Missouri demonstrates this by finding that districts with higher poverty rates and high 
Hispanic populations spend less per pupil, while districts with high Black populations 
spend more per pupil.  “It costs more to achieve desired educational outcomes in school 
districts where larger shares of the student population are black.” 
 In another study, Baker (2011) attacked a leading criticism of underperforming 
schools, specifically those with a high percentage of Black students.  Many critics claim 
that these schools are inefficient and waste resources.  Baker attacks this argument as a 
“straw-man” because these districts and schools have higher costs.  He found little 
evidence that inefficiency in Black districts is a result of greater levels of administrative 
inefficiency when compared with other districts.  Baker argues that segregated schools 
create inefficiencies that increase the money needed to provide an adequate education. 
 Finally, two studies provide a possible reason for the Black-white achievement 
gap that could be traced to the need for increased financial resources (Hanushek and 
Rivkin, 2009; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor, 2005).  These studies indicate that Black 
students have a far higher likelihood of having novice teachers, which is partially 
attributed to low salaries, or at the very least, could be addressed through salary 
increases.  Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2005) found that Black seventh grade students in 
North Carolina were far more likely to have a novice teacher in math and English than 
their white peers.  These numbers were 54 percent more likely in math and 38 percent 
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more likely in English.  Interestingly, two-thirds of this disparity is found within school 
districts, not between them. 
Literature Review Conclusion 
Neither equity nor adequacy has yet been achieved for all school districts 
throughout the United States.  Local wealth continues to be a determinant of school 
quality and student performance.  While some of this is beyond the reach of school 
finance reform, more reform is needed.  Based on research, it is clear that equity does not 
exist among schools or school districts.  As long as inequity persists, it is unlikely that all 
schools will provide a similarly adequate education.  Research indicates that the third 
wave of education finance reform, based on adequacy litigation, failed to significantly 
change the paradigm of school funding or its effects on student performance.  It is 
encouraging that small changes were accomplished that made real, albeit small, positive 
impacts for disadvantaged students.  More should be done in Missouri. 
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Section Three:  Existing Policy 
 In 2005, the state legislature of Missouri passed a bill that transformed the way in 
which K-12 public education was financed throughout the state.  This bill, SB 287, 
abandoned attempts at equitable funding for each student across the state to focus on 
ensuring that each student is provided the amount necessary for an adequate education 
(MSBA, 2014).  This new funding formula first creates a target amount that is needed to 
educate a student adequately.  The formula then calculates the number of students in a 
district, weighting students that are considered “high-need,” and therefore more 
expensive to educate.  The formula also allows an increase of funding for districts that are 
in areas with a high cost of living.  These calculations will result in the total amount a 
district should spend each year.  The state subtracts the amount the district raises from 
local sources and provides the difference to each district.  (Shuls, 2012; MSBA, 2014) 
State Adequacy Target (SAT) 
 In order to create an adequacy-based model of school financing, the state of 
Missouri begins by identifying districts that are considered “Performance Districts.”  
Performance Districts are those that receive a perfect score on their Annual Performance 
Report (APR).  Beginning in Fiscal Year 2019, the number of Performance Districts 
cannot exceed 25 percent of all districts in the state (HB 1689). 
 The State Adequacy Target (SAT) is based on the operating expenditures of 
Performance Districts and is recalculated every two years.  The formula uses operating 
expenditures from the third preceding year that a Performance District is identified.  
Operating expenditures are those that go towards instruction and support services.  In 
addition, the formula only uses funds from state and local sources, not federal.  Finally, 
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the formula calculates the SAT based on the Weighted Average Daily Attendance 
(WADA) of a district, not the actual Average Daily Attendance (ADA).  When these 
numbers have been gathered for all of the Performance Districts in the state, the districts 
with the highest and lowest per-pupil expenditures are taken out of the equation, provided 
that the total enrollment of those districts does not exceed 5 percent of the total 
enrollment for all of the Performance Districts (Shuls, 2012).  Using the method outlined 
above, the state arrives at the State Adequacy Target.  By law, the SAT cannot decrease 
based on a recalculation; it can only be increased. 
 The SAT has seen modest increases since it began being implemented in 2005.  
From that year through the 2009-2010 school year, the SAT was set at $6,117.  It rose 
slightly over the next two years; the SAT for the 2011-2012 school year was $6,131.  The 
SAT saw greater increases over the following years; however, because of state budget 
shortfalls, the SAT has been locked at the 2011-2012 level.  The calculated SAT for the 
2015-2016 school year is $6,580, although the state continues to use the 2012 level of 
$6,131.  (Dorson & Jordan, 2015)  (Interestingly, the calculation for the two-year cycle of 
2012-2014 was $6,716, which was higher than the current two-year cycle calculation.  If 
the state funding formula was fully funded, it is unclear whether the law would require a 
return to the highest SAT calculated or the highest SAT previously used.)  There are 
nearly 900,000 students in Missouri public schools.  Even if this number were not 
weighted when calculating state aid, the state would currently be underfunding schools 
by nearly $400 million.  The Average Daily Attendance, however, is weighted; the state 
is underfunding its public schools by even more. 
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Weighted Average Daily Attendance (WADA) 
 The state of Missouri, as well as the concept of adequacy in general, recognizes 
not all students require the same resources to educate.  In order to adjust for this 
realization, Missouri’s funding formula provides additional money for students that fall 
within certain high-need categories.  While there are many possible ways to add money 
for these students, Missouri does so by increasing the impact that these students have on 
their district’s attendance numbers.  After calculating a district’s Average Daily 
Attendance (ADA), the state adds weights for high-need students to establish a district’s 
Weighted Average Daily Attendance (WADA). 
 A district’s ADA is simply calculated by adding the total number of hours that 
students actually attend school during the entire year, including summer, and dividing 
that number by the total number of school hours that are possible to attend.  (The summer 
hours are calculated at 1,044 for all districts, regardless of their summer school schedule.)  
(Shuls, 2012) 
 The state of Missouri identifies three categories of students that require additional 
resources: those who receive free or reduced price lunches (FRL), those who are on 
Individualized Education Plans (IEPs), and those who have a limited proficiency in the 
English language (LEP) (Shuls, 2012; MSBA, 2014).  School districts that have high 
percentages of these students receive added weights to average attendance. 
 Whether or not a school district has a high percentage of these student populations 
is based on a state-identified threshold.  The state again uses Performance Districts to 
calculate that threshold.  Every two years, the state calculates the average percentage of 
these high-need populations in the state’s Performance Districts.  The threshold is 
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benchmarked to that average.  (Shuls, 2012)  The threshold benchmarks for the school 
years of 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 are 41.0% for free and reduced priced lunches; 12.6% 
for students with IEPs; and 2.1% for students with a limited proficiency in English 
(MSBA, 2014).  Districts that have a higher percentage of students in any of these 
categories receive a weight that is added to their Average Daily Attendance, but only for 
each student that exceeds the benchmarked threshold. 
 Students that exceed the threshold in the three weighted categories are multiplied 
by a state-determined weight.  That extra multiplication of the students exceeding the 
threshold is then added to the district’s ADA, creating the Weighted Average Daily 
Attendance (WADA) of a district.  The weights are different for each of the three high-
need categories.  The weight for free and reduced lunch, that is the number by which 
students exceeding the state threshold are multiplied, is 0.25.  The weight for students 
with IEPs is 0.75.  And the weight for students with limited English proficiency is 0.60.  
A district’s WADA accounts for any combination of these categories in which they 
exceed the state threshold.  (Shuls, 2012) 
Dollar Value Modifier (DVM) 
 School districts that are in areas with a high cost of living are provided additional 
funds by the state.  The state only increases aid to districts with high costs of living, it 
does not decrease aid to districts that experience the opposite (Shuls, 2012).  In order to 
calculate the Dollar Value Modifier (DVM), the Department of Elementary and 
Secondary Education (DESE) uses the state’s median wage per job (calculated by county) 
and the school district’s average wage per job.  (They calculate these figures for the 
school district using the county, micropolitan, or metropolitan area, whichever is 
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appropriate for the district in question.)  Districts that have a higher average wage per job 
than the state median can claim the DVM.  The difference between the district’s average 
wage and the state median wage is multiplied by 15 percent. (Shuls, 2012) 
 A district’s Dollar Value Modifier is multiplied by its Weighted Average Daily 
Attendance.  This result is multiplied by the State Adequacy Target.  The result of this 
formula provides the state-required level of total expenditures to provide an adequate 
education for a district’s students.  From this total expenditure requirement is subtracted 
the local effort provided to a district.  The remainder is provided by state funds. 
Local Effort 
 The amount of local effort that is subtracted from the total expenditure target is 
mostly derived from property taxes and is based on a formula created by the original 
funding bill from 2005.  The amount, therefore, is not necessarily the actual amount that 
is raised locally for the school district.  It is instead largely based on the amount that was 
raised in a district during the 2004-2005 school year.  While each locality has the power 
to set its own property tax rate, the state uses a set tax levy for the calculations of local 
effort.  The state tax levy is 3.43 percent.  In addition, the district uses the assessed 
property valuation from 2004.  (Shuls, 2012) 
 This method of calculation of local property tax effort benefits most districts in 
the state.  District assessed valuation will likely increase over time.  Anchoring that 
valuation to the 2004 level creates a smaller local effort in the state funding formula than 
may actually exist, requiring the state to give more aid to cover the difference.  If a 
district’s value assessment actually decreases, the state amends the local effort in the 
funding formula.  The residents of a district also have the option of increasing their tax 
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levies above the 3.43 percent assumed by the state, which would again mean the state 
pays for a larger district funding gap than actually exists.  Of course, the opposite is true 
as well.  Districts that have a lower property tax rate will get less state aid than they need 
to cover the difference between local effort and the state adequacy target for total 
expenditures.  (Shuls, 2012) 
 In addition to property taxes, there are a few other sources of revenue that count 
as local effort in the state funding formula.  Unlike the state property tax levy used in the 
funding formula, these other sources (state assessed railroad utility tax, financial 
institution taxes, merchant and manufacturer taxes, fees from federal properties, and local 
income taxes) are allowed to fluctuate each year based on the actual amount that is raised.  
The largest source of local effort beyond property tax is known as Proposition C. 
 A 1 percent statewide sales tax, known as Prop C from 1982, counts as local 
effort (Shuls, 2012).  The state collects this tax and distributes it to school districts on the 
basis of their Weighted Average Daily Attendance.  Half of the money received from 
Prop C by a district counts towards local effort in the state funding formula (Shuls, 2012).  
For the fiscal year of 2014, Prop C funds amounted to slightly over $790 million, which 
amounted to $884 per WADA (Dorson & Jordan, 2015). 
Hold Harmless 
 It is important to note that there is a provision from the 2005 funding bill that 
designates certain districts as “hold harmless” districts.  The hold harmless provision 
guarantees that no district in the state will receive less state aid than it did in the final year 
under the old formula.  There were 195 hold harmless districts in 2015.  These districts 
fall into two main categories.  The first, school districts with fewer than 350 students, is 
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guaranteed no less than the total funds they received in 2005.  The second category, 
districts with over 350 students, is guaranteed no drop in funding per-WADA compared 
2005. 
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Section Four: Key Issues 
  The Missouri State Constitution guarantees the right of every student in Missouri 
to receive an adequate education.  The 2005 funding formula, based on this guarantee of 
adequacy, acknowledges that certain students are more expensive to educate.  As a result, 
the formula provides extra funds to districts with high numbers of students living in 
poverty (FRL), students who do not speak English as their first language (ELL), and 
students who have disabilities that affect their learning needs (IEP).  It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that the districts that fall into these categories will spend more per 
student than districts that do not.  That assumption, however, would not be correct in the 
state of Missouri. 
Graph 2: Spending Per-Pupil by Free-and-Reduced-Lunch Students, 2015 
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Graph 4: Spending Per-Pupil by Individualized Education Plan Students, 2015 
 
 
 
Graph 5: Spending Per-Pupil by English Language Learners, 2015 
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 Using St. Louis County as a case study, it is clear that the districts that have the 
highest percentages of at-risk students generally spend less per student than districts with 
lower percentages of students in the three categories which the state designates as high-
risk.  This can be seen in the graphs above.  The trend lines in all three indicate that, on 
average, as the percentage of these students in a district goes up, the spending per student 
in a district goes down.  This is alarming given the state’s acknowledgement that these 
students are more expensive to educate. 
 Out of the three at-risk indicators recognized by the state, however, there is one 
that is more alarming than the others.  The major recommendations in this policy paper 
focus on redistribution of state education dollars based mostly on the indicator of poverty, 
measured by the percentage of students in a district that receive free or reduced lunch 
prices (FRL).  Similar to ELL and IEP students, districts with a higher percentage of 
students living in poverty spend less on average per student.  Percentage of ELL and IEP 
students, at least in St. Louis County, is not a good predictor of district scores on the 
Annual Performance Report (APR).  Percentage of students receiving free or reduced 
lunch prices, however, is correlated to APR performance.  As seen in the graph below, 
districts with higher percentages of FRL students have lower average scores on the APR. 
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Graph 3: Annual Performance Report by Free-and-Reduced-Lunch Students, 2015 
 
 Despite the state’s acknowledgement that students living in poverty are more 
expensive to educate, and despite the evidence that suggests schools with high 
percentages of these students perform worse, spending per pupil is still less.  Not a single 
one of the top eight performing districts in St. Louis County (four schools tied for fifth 
rank in 2015), those with an APR of 98.6 or above, have an FRL population above 30 
percent.  The lowest five performing schools in St. Louis County, of which the highest 
APR is 81 percent, all have an FRL population above 68 percent.  Three of these five 
schools have an FRL population that is above 95 percent.  And yet, there is not a similar 
disparity in spending between these top-performing and low-performing districts. 
 Spending in the top-performing districts, with low FRL populations, ranges from 
$17,869 per student to $9,699 per student in 2015.  Spending in the worst performing 
districts, each with high levels of FRL populations, ranges between $13,903 and $9,916 
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per student.  The average for the top eight performing districts is just over $13,000.  The 
average for the bottom five performing districts is about $11,400. 
 Two things are clear from these data.  First, the number of students living in 
poverty has an effect on the performance of a school district.  Second, the districts with 
the highest percentage of students living in poverty do not spend more than the districts 
that have a far lower percentage of these students. 
 This reality is concerning for St. Louis County and for the state of Missouri.  That 
said, all of the districts in St. Louis spend more per student than what the state has 
deemed necessary for an adequate education.  If the state funding formula was fully 
funded, it would be fulfilling its constitutional requirements to provide an adequate 
education.  The disparity in spending is a result of a choice.  The citizens in wealthier 
districts have largely chosen to pay, in some cases significantly, extra amounts of 
property tax in order to provide more funding to their schools.  They do so because they 
believe that these extra funds will provide a better education for the students in their 
district.  It would be inappropriate to believe that this is an ill-informed or naïve choice 
on their part.  The additional funds must be part of the reason that their school districts 
are performing better.  The recommendations made in this policy paper are not meant to 
create complete equality, but their purpose is to shift some state funds to those districts 
with high levels of impoverished students. 
 Missouri’s public education funding formula is based on a combination of local 
funds and state funds.  Districts that choose to increase local funds can provide far higher 
amounts of money than is expected from the state.  Districts that cannot provide as much 
local money, especially those with high-need students, receive a greater amount from the 
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state.  This system, when fully funded, still creates disparities among districts and 
students.  This system, however, is currently underfunded.  This underfunding, 
shamefully, magnifies the disparities between the wealthier and poorer districts in the 
state of Missouri. 
 Missouri’s funding formula is currently underfunded at a rate of about $700 per 
student (A Shaky Foundation).  This underfunding is not spread equally among students 
in Missouri.  It is prorated based on a percentage of the state funds that a district receives.  
In other words, if the funding formula is underfunded by 20 percent, each district loses 20 
percent of its base funds from the state.  This results in the districts that receive the most 
in state aid being underfunded by the highest dollar amount.  This distinction is greatest 
in St. Louis County. 
 The wealthiest districts in St. Louis County, such as Clayton, appropriately 
receive the lowest amount of state aid.  In fact, districts like Clayton, Brentwood, and 
Ladue receive a very small amount of state aid, well below $100 per student.  And given 
this, the prorating system makes some sense.  If the underfunding was distributed on a 
basis of equality, five districts in St. Louis County would lose every dollar of state aid 
they receive.  The prorating system, however, creates other problems.  The wealthiest 
districts lose insignificant amounts of state aid.  There are six districts in the county that 
lose less than $50 per student.  The poorer districts, however, lose significant amounts of 
aid.  There are nine districts in the county, generally the lowest performing districts, 
which lose over $700 per student.  There are districts outside of St. Louis County that 
lose more than $900 per student. 
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Table 2: State Aid Lost by St. Louis Area School Districts, 2015 
District FRL % APR Score State Aid Lost 
Clayton 15.5 98.6 $34 
Kirkwood 15.9 98.9 $38 
Ladue 12.6 99.3 $39 
Bayless 66.4 96.8 $876 
Ferguson-
Florissant 100 69.6 $800 
Jennings 100 81.1 $443 
Riverview Gardens 98.1 79.3 $455 
Source: Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, FY2015 
 
A Shaky Foundation (2014), The Missouri Budget Project 
 
 It is unacceptable that the Missouri legislature has failed to fully fund its 
commitment to public education.  It is unacceptable that the Clayton School District loses 
$34 per student, just as it is unacceptable that the Bayless School District loses $876 per 
student.  The underfunding for Missouri’s foundation formula is not the topic of this 
paper.  Missouri must, however, find a way to fund schools to the full amount that is 
required.  Until this is done, the underfunded portion should be distributed in a way that 
does less harm to the schools that need the money the most. 
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Section Five: Recommendations and Conclusions 
 It is unlikely that there will be a major overhaul of the way Missouri finances 
public education.  There are, however, small common sense changes that can be made to 
address the need for increased resources in districts with a great number of high-need 
students, specifically those living in poverty.  Some of these changes call for increases in 
the aggregate level of state aid to schools.  Others call for a redistribution of certain 
funds, giving a greater share of those funds to high-need districts.  These are 
recommendations that would apply throughout the state.  Analysis of these 
recommendations is focused on St. Louis County.   
The Factor of Poverty 
 Poverty impacts education.  The state of Missouri appropriately recognizes 
poverty as a high-risk factor in its public schools.  Along with students with IEPs and 
students who are English Language Learners, poverty is weighted in Missouri’s funding 
formula. 
Each student receiving free or reduced lunch prices, above the state average of 41 
percent, receives a weight that increases the amount of money that a district receives for 
that student.  The weighting for impoverished students is .25.  This weighting is too low.  
The weighting for students with IEPs and ELL students is significantly higher, at .75 and 
.60 respectively.  This paper does not recommend reducing those weightings.  But 
because poverty is the strongest correlation to school performance, as discussed in 
Section Four, the state must weight that factor more significantly. 
The recommendation of this paper is to double the weight for students on free or 
reduced lunch prices to .50.  This would provide significantly higher funds to schools that 
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have a larger number of students living in poverty.  These funds should be used for a 
myriad of resources for these students.  They should be used to reduce class sizes and 
hire more experienced teachers.  They should be used for collective-impact services that 
would reduce the burden of poverty both inside and outside of the school. 
Several schools in St. Louis County would experience a tremendous impact from 
this recommendation.  One hundred percent of Jennings’ students, for example, qualify 
for free or reduced lunch prices.  Jennings had an Average Daily Attendance (ADA) of 
about 2,400 students in the 2014-2015 school year.  The average percentage of students 
in a district that qualify for reduced lunch prices is 41 percent; only students beyond that 
threshold receive the weighting.  Therefore Jennings receives the weighting for about 
1,400 of its students.  At the current weight of .25, Jennings’ WADA increased by about 
350 because of poverty in the district.  This recommendation would increase the school’s 
WADA by an additional 350. 
At current expenditure rates, Jennings receives about $5,400 for the state for each 
student that attends the school on a daily basis.  This recommendation would increase 
that figure by $740, giving Jennings School District nearly an additional $1.8 million 
each school year.  This is money that could be used to provide services that 
counterbalance the devastation poverty has on education. 
Other school districts in St. Louis County would see similar increases.  The 
Hazelwood School District has an APR of 85 percent and over 60 percent of its students 
receive free or reduced lunch prices.  This recommendation would increase the total 
expenditures for Hazelwood by nearly $3 million, providing each student that attends 
daily an additional $175 in resources for the school year.  For Ritenour, a school district 
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with an APR score below 80 percent and a FRL population above 75 percent, this 
recommendation would provide an additional $1.8 million each year, an additional $312 
for each student that attends daily. 
This is the most significant recommendation that is presented here.  This 
recommendation would have the greatest impact on the overall education budget for the 
state of Missouri because it calls for an increase of funds for every district that has above 
41 percent of its students receiving free or reduced lunch prices.  This recommendation 
does not call for any decrease to counterbalance these additions. 
 The Missouri foundation formula is underfunded, which makes any increase 
unlikely and difficult.  Because of this underfunding, an increase for some districts would 
mean a decrease for others.  If the funding formula were fully financed, however, this 
would not be the case.  But the money has to come from somewhere.  State taxes and 
expenditures would either increase overall or the budget for other social services or 
expense would have to decrease.  It is time for the citizens of Missouri, a state with 
relatively low government revenue, to value education for all students throughout the 
state. 
Accurate Assessment of Property Value 
 It is important to remember that the local effort that is used to calculate the state 
foundation formula is not the actual amount that is raised locally each year.  In general, it 
is the amount that was raised during the 2004-2005 school year.  The bulk of local effort 
comes from property taxes.  Property taxes are raised by assessing a tax on a percentage 
of local property value.  The funding formula assumes that the local property tax levy is 
3.43 percent and the assessed valuation of all property is held constant at the level from 
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December 31, 2004.  There is no recommended change to the assumed level of 3.43 
percent.  This benefits school districts that have chosen to raise their tax levies, 
contributing more local funds.  Some poor and wealthy districts have chosen to do this in 
St. Louis County and throughout the state.  A change in this assumption by the funding 
formula would disproportionately harm poor districts. 
 The funding formula, however, should no longer assume property assessed value 
at the 2004 level.  This assumption disproportionately benefits districts that have the 
biggest increases in local wealth.  While the formula does allow the assessed valuation to 
drop, poor districts are still harmed.  Wealthy districts in the state have seen their 
property values rise drastically since 2004.  This increase does not count for anything in 
the funding formula.  This means that the state provides an artificially high amount of 
funds to wealthy districts.  Because the state underfunds education, this robs poorer 
districts of much-needed funds.  This cannot be allowed to continue. 
 Because the state does not update assessed valuation, wealthy districts can 
essentially choose one of two advantages.   They can significantly lower property taxes 
and retain the same level of funding.  Or they can hold their tax levies stable and 
significantly increase overall funding for their schools.  Poor districts do not have this 
option. 
St. Louis County provides an excellent case study for the detriment of the current 
policy in regards to assessed valuation.  There are districts in St. Louis County, such as 
Brentwood, Kirkwood, Rockwood, University City, and Webster Groves that have seen 
their property values rise by over 25 percent.  And yet this rise in property value is not 
counted towards their local effort.  Other districts, such as Ferguson-Florissant, 
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Hazelwood, Jennings, and Riverview have seen an increase of fewer than two percent or 
an actual drop in valuation.  The state does adjust the formula if valuation drops, but that 
does not solve the real problem. In an underfunded system, wealthy districts are getting 
an artificially high amount of state aid at a time when all districts are receiving less aid 
than they deserve, especially poorer districts. 
The chart below clearly demonstrates that the poorer districts, as measured by 
percentage of students who qualify for free or reduced lunch prices, have had the smallest 
growth in assessed valuation.  At the same time, wealthy districts have seen massive 
increases in local wealth, none of which is accounted for by the funding formula. 
 
Table 3: Assessed Valuation of St. Louis Area School Districts, 2004 & 2015 
District FRL % 2004 Assessed Valuation 
2015 Assessed 
Valuation 
% 
Change 
Clayton 15.5 $837,032,780 $1,002,431,060 +19.8 
Kirkwood 15.9 $907,281,960 $1,260,364,990 +38.9 
Ladue 12.6 $1,163,195,840 $1,423,709,590 +22.4 
Ferguson-
Florissant 100 $890,041,320 $884,795,980 -0.6 
Jennings 100 $94,176,970 $95,577,080 +1.5 
Riverview 
Gardens 98.1 $222,320,810 $193,946,730 -14.6 
Source: Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education  
 
Missouri must recalculate the local effort in the funding formula based on the 
actual assessed valuation of each district.  There is no doubt that this shift would create 
anger among citizens of wealthier districts.  This anger is understandable as their schools 
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would lose funding.  Nonetheless, this shift must occur to retain the spirit of the 2005 
funding bill as well as compensate poorer districts for the massive losses they see from 
state underfunding. 
Weighted Prop C Funds 
 Proposition C was passed in Missouri in 1982.  This proposition instituted a 
statewide sales tax of 1 percent that is earmarked for education.  Today, this money goes 
to districts on a WADA basis and districts count half as local revenue.  As Baker and 
Corcoran (2012) noted, these funds do not increase inequity in education in Missouri, but 
because of the way they are distributed, they sustain that inequity.  The authors argue that 
a “more progressive distribution [of these funds] according to need and for equalization 
according to wealth, could go a long way toward eliminating the regressive nature of 
Missouri’s school funding.” 
 Proposition C is clearly a valuable source of revenue for school districts.  But the 
value should be distributed in a way that provides greater benefit to districts with higher 
percentages of impoverished students.  For districts that have a higher-than-average 
percentage of students qualifying for free or reduced lunch prices, which is currently 41 
percent, Prop C funds should not count as any local effort.  This change would increase 
state funding for poorer school districts by over $400 per “weighted” student (Shuls, 
2012), which would mean an even greater increase per actual student in attendance each 
day. 
 There are several concerns with this recommendation.  First, the foundation 
formula is already underfunded.  Increasing the amount of money that the state should 
provide poorer districts will only increase the amount that the state underfunds education.  
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As stated earlier, these recommendations are based on a fully funded foundation formula; 
however, this is a worthy change even with the underfunding.  By increasing the amount 
that poorer districts should receive, they will also receive more under the current system 
of prorating state funds. 
 There is also a concern that this recommendation will not actually increase the 
funds that the state provides poor school districts.  Because the money is no longer 
counted as local funds, it would count as state funds.  Policy makers could simply use the 
funds from Prop C to replace the amount that should be added to the funding formula by 
the drop in local revenue.  This is a common tactic in legislative bodies when citizens 
choose to earmark certain funds, such as those from lotteries or gambling, to increase 
educational dollars.  Legislators simply decrease the amount of general funds provided 
and replace them with the earmarked funds.  This cannot be allowed to happen with Prop 
C funds. 
Held Harmless No Longer 
 The largest impediment to the recommendations provided in this paper is the 
current underfunding of Missouri’s public schools.  This underfunding makes any 
recommendation that would increase total education expenditures precarious at best.  
This final recommendation is designed to encourage the state to fully fund education or at 
least to ease the burden on poor districts until they do. 
 Until the state fully funds education, districts with a less-than-average percentage 
of students qualifying for free or reduced lunch prices would no longer be able to keep 
the “hold harmless” distinction.  Districts that are hold harmless should actually receive 
less money per weighted student from the state than they did in 2005.  The hold harmless 
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provision of the 2005 funding bill guaranteed that districts could not drop below that per-
WADA amount.  As such, many districts in St. Louis County and throughout the state 
have received a hold harmless distinction.  There are both wealthier districts and poorer 
districts that have been held harmless.  There are doubts about whether the hold harmless 
distinction should exist at all; however, it currently helps a variety of districts.  Therefore, 
this paper is not recommending ending the distinction permanently.  The 
recommendation is simply to end it temporarily for districts that have less than 41 percent 
of its students who qualify for free or reduced lunch prices.  Based on those held 
harmless in 2015, the districts recommended to lose that distinction are Brentwood, 
Clayton, Kirkwood, Ladue, Lindbergh, and Parkway.  
 It is hoped that this decrease of funding for wealthier districts will encourage state 
law makers, specifically those that are elected from wealthier constituencies, to fully fund 
the educational foundation formula.  It is further hoped that this decrease in funding for 
wealthier districts will call attention to the problem of underfunding, as it would likely 
cause a more significant decrease in state funds than the system of prorating currently 
does.  Missouri’s foundation formula must be fully funded.  No districts should be 
harmed by the failure of state law makers.  But until those legislators choose to act, only 
poorer districts should be held harmless. 
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Conclusion 
Missouri’s educational system is unhealthy.  Educational outcomes are far too 
closely tied to geography, race, and especially socioeconomic status.  Money alone 
cannot provide renewed health.  But without the necessary funds, Missouri’s 
underperforming schools will never improve.  The recommendations here are designed to 
work within the current system.  These small, but necessary, changes will channel 
increased funds to schools with high student poverty.  Once the Missouri General 
Assembly chooses to fully fund education, these recommendations will have minimal 
financial impact on wealthy districts. 
As democracy expanded throughout the history of the United States, the 
Founders’ demands of an educated and engaged citizenry became increasingly important.  
Education is no longer reserved for the elite or wealthy.  Each state in the US has made 
the commitment to provide an adequate education to all of its citizens.  Providing an 
adequate education is not just necessary for the future of students, families, and 
communities.  It is necessary for the health of our republic. 
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School 2004 Assessed Valuation 2015 Assessed Valuation % Change
Affton $338,521,760.00 $372,136,990.00 +9.9
Bayless $126,851,090.00 $143,921,040.00 +13.5
Brentwood $223,427,010.00 $281,055,970.00 +25.8
Clayton $837,032,780.00 $1,002,431,060.00 +19.8
Ferguson-Florissant $890,041,320.00 $884,795,980.00 -0.6
Hancock Place $52,710,620.00 $159,332,040.00 +202.3
Hazelwood $1,595,163,090.00 $1,598,735,070.00 +0.2
Jennings $94,176,970.00 $95,577,080.00 +1.5
Kirkwood $907,281,960.00 $1,260,364,990.00 +38.9
Ladue $1,163,195,840.00 $1,423,709,590.00 +22.4
Lindbergh $1,013,709,110.00 $1,199,688,760.00 +18.3
Maplewood-RH $184,545,260.00 $263,038,660.00 +42.5
Mehlville $1,381,635,050.00 $1,658,413,330.00 +20.0
Normandy $215,677,310.00 $232,335,940.00 +7.7
Parkway $3,515,415,440.00 $4,158,544,670.00 +18.3
Pattonville $1,202,133,790.00 $1,304,337,970.00 +8.5
Ritenour $495,415,210.00 $539,635,270.00 +8.9
Riverview Gardens $222,320,810.00 $193,946,730.00 -14.6
Rockwood $2,520,008,910.00 $3,207,184,640.00 +27.3
University City $458,756,240.00 $574,360,760.00 +25.2
Valley Park $122,713,040.00 $157,498,130.00 +28.3
Webster Groves $544,983,760.00 $700,894,180.00 +28.6
Source: Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
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